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1 Introduction
Over the recent pastno more than two hundred yearsthe Western World has
experienced an extraordinary change in the economic environment and in all
aspects of human life. We can observe that, in this period, all OECD countries
have experienced a dramatic increase both in the longevity of their citizens and
in the aggregate and per capita income. Simultaneously, the traditional social
environment changed profoundly: the proportions of the population that were
educated, and that were retired, increased signicantly, causing the proportion
of working people to shrink.
Looking at the details, we can stress some qualitative and quantitative facts
behind these features of the economies. Life expectancy in the last century
and a half increased tremendously: in 1850 it was below 60 years in US (Lee,
2001) and around 40 in England (Galor, 2005), while today it almost reaches
80 years (Fogel, 1994). At the same time, both the shares of lifetime that
people devoted to education and retirement increased. In 1850 the percentage
of people enrolled in primary education was less than 10%, so, on average, the
time devoted to schooling was negligible. Now people, adding up informal (child
caring carried out by parents) and formal schooling, study for around 20 years,
one quarter of their expected lifetime. The participation of people in retirement
shows similar trends: in 1850 less than three years were devoted to retirement,
while today, especially in Europe, thanks in particular to the introduction of
social security systems after World War II, people retire for almost 20 years:1
again, one quarter of their lifetime (Latulippe, 1996).2 In gure 1 we show
how life expectancy and its components, in terms of economic roles of people,
evolved in the last century and a half, for the USA. In Europe some trends
presented here are even more evident: in particular, life expectancy increased
more rapidly (from a lower level to a higher level than in the US) and retirement
length increased more.
Fig.1. Life expectancy and economic roles in the US. Source: Lee (2001), www.bls.gov, and our calculations.
1All data come from www.census.org and our calculations.
2For European data see Galasso and Profeta (2004).
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One of the most important implications of these trends is that developed
countries are changing their political structures, moving from a form of "work-
ersdictatorship" to a more diluted political representation: the voices of both
young and retired people in the political debate continually increase, and in-
tuitively their interests should not coincide with the interests of adult workers.
This almost certainly impacts on the composition of the aggregate demand.
Consider, for example, the increasing demand for expenditure in health care for
elderly people, residential structures for retired people, old age entertainment,
etc. Here we are, however, interested in the production side of the economy,
specically in the mechanisms that run from individual and aggregate prefer-
ences to the production process and which could be a¤ected by demographic,
and therefore political, changes. A conict of interests among age classes, in
terms of production choices, will probably arise between workers and students,
if these are innovation-prone, and retired people, who are not interested in tech-
nologic innovation, since their real income is not tied to their own labour income,
which is linked to the past innovation choices. Moreover, a conict of interests
can also arise between young people and adults: for the former innovation has
long lasting e¤ects, since it a¤ects both their productivity in the labour market
once they will be adult and their childrens capacity to acquire human capital.
For the latter, a new technology impacts on the ability of their children to pay
them a pension. These di¤erent incentive schemes would hardly be identical.
Since our theory rests on the idea that human capital and technology are
the two engines that boost economic growth,3 we analyze how a longer life ex-
pectancy a¤ects the dynamics of these two variables. In this framework we
analyze, by means of a three-periods overlapping generation model in which life
expectancy endogenously changes, the interactions among education, techno-
logical change, aging and growth.4 What we have in mind are the potential
conicts of interests that arise among di¤erent generations. Due to di¤erent
time horizons and economic incentives, individual and aggregate choices can
endogenously change because of the demographic evolution of population.
The purpose of this work is to provide an illustration of how an econ-
omy might evolve when life expectancy mainly a¤ects both private and pub-
lic choices concerning the production side of the economy and, therefore, the
growth process. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we specify what
we consider "systemic innovation. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
contains a simple dynamic example. Section 5 concludes.
3 It has been increasingly recognized that both human capital formation and technologi-
cal changes play important roles in economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer 1986). That is,
the improvement of knowledge and skills embodied in labour, as well as changes in technol-
ogy, mostly embodied in physical capital, determine the potential for moving the production
frontier outward.
4Recent studies have shown, at least theoretically, that economic growth is helped by an
increase in life expectancy (Galor and Weil, 1998; Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Cervellati
and Sunde, 2005).
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2 Systemic Innovation
Innovation is a discontinuity in knowledge and, therefore, in production tech-
niques, whose outcome is an appreciable increase in productivity. With the
same resources the system is capable of producing more goods, or it is capa-
ble of producing the same quantity of goods with less resources. We refer to
a systemic innovation5 as to a type of innovation that, in order to be imple-
mented, has to pass through the endorsement of a political mechanism, where,
in general, the interests of di¤erent groups of agents (consumers, producers, the
government, high/low skill groups, etc.),6 do not coincide. The public nature
of systemic innovation, in contrast with the Schumpeterian view of innovations
developed by rms running for the best cost-saving technology, comes from the
historical point of view where the implementation of a new technology is rarely
the outcome of pure prot-maximizing by rms.
The public nature of systemic innovation requires a di¤erent innovation
model in comparison with linear ones based on R&D and, consequently, on in-
novation and technological transfer. Accordingly to Mansell and When (1998),
the systemic innovation model can be dened as a chain model, characterized
by interdependence between both the development of knowledge and its appli-
cation to the production processes and negotiation of interests among di¤erent
agents. Innovation used to be a linear trajectory from new knowledge to new
product, now it becomes neither singular nor linear, but systemic. It arises
from complex interactions between many individuals, organizations, and their
operating environment.
Following the historical point of view delineated by economists like Mokyr
(1998a, 2002) and Olson (1982), in this study we focus our attention on systemic
innovation as a growth-enhancing technology. Bauer (1995) points out that a
decentralized market outcome seems to be a poor description of many technology
breakthroughs. Economic convenience is certainly not irrelevant, but, as Mokyr
(1998a) suggests: there usually is, at some level, a non-market institution that
has to approve, license or provide some other imprimatur without which rms
cannot change their production methods. The market test by itself is not always
enough. In the past, it almost never was. (p. 219) Thus, as reported by Olson,
the decision whether to adopt a new technology is likely to be resisted by those
who lose by it through some kind of activism aimed at inuencing the decision
by the above-mentioned institutions.
Consequently, we construct a model in which, for endogenous reasons, tech-
nology adoption is delegated to a regulatory institution, the democratic vote.
We formalize the idea that an innovation, before being introduced in large-scale
production, has to be approved by some non-market institution. Its adoption
5We take it that there is no uncertainty in the outcome of a new technology of this kind:
once the decision to shift to the new technology is undertaken, with probability one a pro-
ductivity enhancement takes place. It follows that we are not dealing with risky process of
producing new ideas, but with the process of implementing existing ideas in new ways that
are more e¢ cient, although not for everybody in the same way.
6 In our framework the contrast evolves among di¤erent age groups.
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is ex-post disposable for all individuals in the economy, but ex-ante the choice
to adopt it or not can be a¤ected by the interests of di¤erent age groups. Ac-
cording to Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005), the central authority can be seen
as a licensing system that has some agency to approve new technologies be-
fore they are brought to the market. Again in Mokyr (1998a)s words: almost
everywhere some kind of non-marketing control and licensing system has been
introduced. A recent example is the creation of standard-setting agencies such
as the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) or, about property
rights, the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO).
To capture the evolving clash between resistive and innovative interests, we
consider an economy that, at any point in time, is populated by three di¤er-
ent overlapping groups of agents di¤ering in terms of their life horizons and
incentives schemes. In fact, besides the increasing human capital accumulation,
productivity improvements come from the innovation process. A systemic inno-
vation is implemented if and only if there is a political consensus for it: because
its net benets are not equal among the di¤erent age classes, in a heterogeneous
setting there is always room for suboptimal provision of the innovation itself.
Among di¤erent political mechanisms (majority vote, lobby intervention and
so on) for implementing a new innovation, according to Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1996) as well as Aghion and Howitt (1998), we assume that the public choice
is carried out by means of a democratic majority voting where the interests of
the absolute majority of the population prevail.
3 The model
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N+: The economy is populated by homo-
geneous agents of measure one living up to three periods: they survive with
probability one from youth to adulthood and with probability pt to old age.
When people of generation t are young they split their unit time endowment
between schooling (et) and working as unskilled (1  et), using the average hu-
man capital that their parents bequeathed them (in the form of an externality).
Their income is linear in human capital and is, in case, taxed for a new pro-
ductive technology to be implemented in the next period.7 From now on, we
call this operation of taxation simply innovation tax. It is a x share of income
and takes the values i ; 0 < i < 1, or zero in case innovation is decided or not,
respectively. As adults, each of them has a single child. Adultshuman capi-
tal is a function of past human capital and the e¤ort they made when young.
They combine their human capital with a TFP parameter that increases if a
new technology is endorsed the period before. Their income is divided between
consumption, a constant share s that goes, in a PAYGO fashion, in paying
their parentspensions8 and, in case, the innovation tax it+1. When old, they
7Using a school/leisure choice it would have been di¢ cult to introduce the tax on innova-
tion.
8We do not discuss the way in which the pension system is implemented and if it can be
politically self-sustaining, as Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) do. We assume instead that a
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consume the pension that their children pass to them, net of the innovation
tax it+2. The complete scheme of the timing for an agent born at time t is
represented in gure 2.
Born with Ht
Votes over it
Chooses et
Consumes ct
Technology At+1 is in place
ht+1 is achieved
Votes over it+1
Consumes ct+1
Votes over it+2
Gets Pt+2
Consumes ct+2
Fig.2. Timing for an agent born at time t.
Agentspolitical lever is characterized by their ability to vote, every period
of their life, for a systemic innovation to be implemented in the next period. In
order to take into account the increasing and, in some cases, crucial power of old
retired, we assume that young people show a lower turnout rate with respect to
adults and old.9 Thus, their weight in the political process is represented by an
exogenous parameter  2 (0; 1]. All adults and old can vote, so their measure
is 1 and pt, respectively, where pt is the share of old alive.
Production output is undertaken by rms: competitive rms employ the
human capital supplied by agents as the only input, using a technology At,
taken as given and out of their control.
3.1 Utility, budget constraints and production functions.
The expected lifetime utility for an agent born at time t (1) is non altruistic
and its arguments are the consumption levels in the three periods.  2 (0; 1) is
the usual discount parameter, while pt is the probability to survive in old age.
In this subsection, despite the time su¢ x, we consider pt as a constant. Thus,
we could just write p, but below we will endogenize it and it will be important
for the analysis to let this variable change over time.
ut = log ct +  log ct+1 + pt log ct+2 (1)
The budget constraints in the three periods are as follows. Note that in
every period the incomes are taxed in case a new technology is decided to be
implemented in the next period.
ct = Ht(1  et)(1  it) (2)
ct+1 = yt+1(1  s  it+1) (3)
commitment between generations is in place and no one can default on it.
9Galasso and Profeta (2004) report that the turnout rate among people aged 60-69 relative
to people 18-29 is double in the US and 50% higher in France.
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ct+2 = Pt+2(1  it+2) (4)
Production of nal good in the skilled sector (i.e. by adult) takes the form
of a decreasing return function of human capital (6). The TFP parameter At
is equal to At 1 in case a new technology is not implemented (it 1 = 0), while
At = (1+ )At 1;  > 0 in case a new technology is implemented (it 1 = i). At
time t = 0; At = A0 = A: A compact formulation for At is:
At = (1 + 
it 1
i
)At 1 (5)
where  denotes the growth rate of the technology and is a strictly positive
scalar. The straightforward expression for skilled production at time t is as
follows, with 0 <  < 1:
yt = Ath

t = At 1(1 + 
it 1
i
)ht (6)
Human capital of an adult born at time t (7) increases with the human
capital with which she is born (Ht) and the e¤ort she exerted in schooling
when young (et). The human capital depreciates by a factor (1  ) in case an
innovation is decided at time t. The assumption is that when new technologies
are implemented, human capital produced in schools based upon previous types
of technology is less useful (Boucekkine et al., 2002, 2005). Ranges for the
parameters are  > 0, 0   < 1 and 0 <  < 1.
ht+1 = 

(1   it
i
)etH

t

(7)
At the same time, an old of generation (t 2) receives (8) that is the share s
of income that an adult of generation (t  1) disbursed in the PAYGO system,
multiplied by the coe¢ cient p 1t that takes into account the share of people
surviving to old age.
Pt =
syt
pt
=
sAth

t
pt
(8)
3.2 Individual optimization with given innovation policy
In every period of her life an agent takes as given the innovation policy. We will
add the case of majority voting on the innovation policy later. Agents choose
the schooling time when young. From the rst order condition @ut@et = 0 we
obtain the optimal schooling time:
et =
[+ pt]
1 + [+ pt]
(9)
It is easy to nd a positive relationship between pt and the equilibrium
value of et: the longer is the life expectancy of people, the higher is the time
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investment needed to nance their prolonged consumption, consistently with
existing literature. Substituting (9) in (7) and writing ht instead of Ht (due to
straightforward equilibrium considerations) we get the accumulation function of
human capital as a function of past human capital, the innovation policy chosen
the period before and the fraction of time youth spend in education. At time t
we obtain:
ht+1 = 

1   it
i

[+ pt]
1 + [+ pt]
ht (10)
The human capital accumulation function shows the usual concave shape
(given that 0 <  < 1) and the role of human capital depreciation in the case of
innovation,
 
1   iti

, is clear. Moreover, the human capital augmenting e¤ect
of life expectancy can be evaluated by looking at the expression of et .
3.3 Endogenous life expectancy
In this subsection we allow for the level of life expectancy to increase with
the aggregate human capital level as in, among others, Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002) as well as Cervellati and Sunde (2005).10 The probability to reach old age
is, therefore, pt = p(Ht l); where l is a lag of at least two periods for ensuring
that people are not internalizing changes in life expectancy when optimizing
their human capital level. We impose some restrictions on p(H), in order to get
simple results. p(0) = p0 > 0 avoids the extreme case of a disappearing old age,
while @P (H)@H = pH > 0 replicates the empirical evidence of a positive correlation
between life expectancy and education. Because p is a probability, we assume
that limH!+1 p(H) = pL  1. Simple algebra and the equilibrium identity
ht = Ht allow us to rewrite the expression of human capital accumulation (10):
ht+1 =  1(ht; it)h

t
The function  1 is always greater than zero, increasing in h and, for the re-
strictions imposed on the function p, limited from above by some nite number.
In the case of both innovation and no innovation it is possible to show that mul-
tiple nite equilibria can arise, as we show in gure 3. In this gure we represent
the case of innovation, where it = i: hS1 and hS2 are stable equilibria, while
hU1 is the unstable equilibrium. Of course, in the case of innovation the whole
graph of ht+1 lies below the one of no innovation: it can be, therefore, the case
10Empirically, both private and aggregate endowment of human capital are conductive to
a longer life, although we focus on the aggregate view: on the one hand, demographic and
historical evidence suggests that the level of human capital profoundly a¤ect the longevity of
people. For example, the evidence presented by Mirowsky and Ross (1998) supports strongly
the notions that better educated people are more able to coalesce health-producing behaviour
into a coherent lifestyle, are more motivated to adopt such behaviour by a greater sense of
control over the outcomes in their own lives, and are more likely to inspire the same type
of behaviour in their children. Schultz (1993, 1998) evidences that childrens life expectancy
increases with parents human capital and education. On the other hand, there is evidence that
the human capital intensive inventions of new drugs increases life expectancy (Lichtenberg,
1998, 2003) and societies endowed with an higher level of human capital are more likely to
innovate, especially in research elds like medicine (Mokyr, 1998b).
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that if innovation takes place there is room, due to the depreciation of human
capital, for two stable steady states, while in the case of no innovation only one
stable steady state arises. In gure 4 we show the case of no innovation (it = 0):
the graph of ht+1 is higher and only one stable steady state, hS3, arises.
ht
ht+1
ht+1=Γ1(p0;i)htε
ht+1=Γ1(pL;i)htε
ht+1=Γ1(p(ht);i)htε
hU1hS1 hS2
Fig.3. Equilibria of human capital level in the case of innovation and endogenous life expectancy.
ht
ht+1
ht+1=Γ1(p0;0)htε
ht+1=Γ1(pL;0)htε
ht+1=Γ1(p(ht);0)htε
hS3
Fig.4. Equilibrium of human capital level in the case of no innovation and endogenous life expectancy.
Apart from the innovation policy, increases of , ,  and  shift ht+1 upward,
leading both to higher level of human capital for any steady state and to the
disappearance of the low steady state, hS1 in gure 3.
The fact that (i) the growth of human capital is bounded from above and
(ii) human capital is the only factor of production and its accumulation function
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does not depend upon the value of the TFP parameter allows us to study, in
an "additive" way, how human capital and production evolve. For example,
once human capital reaches a steady state, using (6) we can keep track of the
nal production just looking at the innovation policy undertaken. Therefore
the steady state production is a constant level in the case of no innovation
(y = A0(hS)), while it will be an increasing level (at the constant rate ) in
the case of innovation (yt = A0(1+ )t(hS)). The value hS represents one of
the stable steady states that we can nd in gure 3 or 4.
3.4 Endogenous innovation policy
Up to this point the innovation policy has been taken as given, either innovation
or no innovation, and the same in every period. From now on we will use, when
necessary, I or N , respectively. Now we allow agents to vote upon the innovation
policy, and the decisions aggregate by means of a majority mechanism. With our
setup the shares of young, adult and old voters are +1+pt ;
1
+1+pt
and pt+1+pt ,
respectively. The more the life expectancy increases, the more important is the
relative weight of old and the less important are the weights of young and adult
in the political process.
Proposition 1 For values of life expectancy smaller than
p^ = 1  
a "workers dictatorship" arises: no matter what young and old prefer, adult
alone will set the agenda in terms of innovation. There are no values of pt
such that another form of dictatorship (i.e. a single age group has the absolute
majority) can arise.
Proof. Adult get the absolute majority if and only if their share is bigger
than 12 : imposing
1
+1+pt
> 12 we obtain, solving for pt, the expression in the
proposition. For similar considerations it is possible to show that both +1+pt
and pt+1+pt can not exceed
1
2 .
In early stages of development process the political power is, therefore, in
the hands of adult alone, while the more the human capital increases, the longer
life expectancy is and the smaller the share of adult is. It can be the case that pt
exceeds p^: from this moment on decisions about innovation need the consensus
of two age groups over three, so the political process becomes a little more
complex. We call this stage "diluted power". The specic cost-benet setup of
the innovation implies that old people are always against innovation: they are
supposed to pay today a fraction of their income for a new technology that will
be available once they are dead. This simplies our analysis: in the case of
"workers dictatorship" this feature is not inuential, since only adult decide,
while in the case of pt > p^ we need to know, to be sure that innovation will be
voted, whether both adult and young will vote for I. Otherwise N will be the
implemented policy.
10
Our strategy is to check, for all the three-period sequences of policies,11
if agentsvote and policy outcome is consistent with the conguration under
analysis. Let us now dene some variables that will be useful in the policy
setting framework and describe agentsbehaviour in the three di¤erent stages
of their life.
We call vjt the choice of innovation policy voted by an agent of type j (with
j 2 J = fY ;A;Og) at time t and it can take the values f; g, that stand for
innovation and no innovation, respectively. Note that olds choice is always to
vote against innovation, as will be clear below: vOt = ;8t 2 N+. In every
period the function Mt aggregates the votes of the three generations alive and
its outcome is the majority choice:
Mt(v
Y
t ; v
A
t ; v
O
t ) =
8>><>>:
I if

vYt = v
A
t =  and pt > p^
vAt =  and pt < p^
N otherwise
(11)
A new innovation will be, therefore, implemented at time (t+1) if and only
if Mt = I.
Now the optimization problem for the agent is to vote, in every period of her
life, upon the innovation policy and, taking the outcome of the voting mechanism
in every periods as given, to allocate her youth time between schooling and
working. We study the choice of the three generations backward, from the old
to the young, at time t. Thus, the individuals under analysis are old agents
born at time (t  2), adult agents born at time (t  1) and young born at time
t. The time structure of our political problem can be represented in gure 5.
t t+2t-1 t+1
vO
vA
vY
t-2
Mt-2 Mt-1 Mt Mt+1 Mt+2
Fig.5. Scheme of votes aggregation.
11Being the two states of voting variable fI;Ng and the three periods that an agent live,
the possible streams of policies are 23 = 8: fIt; It+1; It+2g; fIt; It+1;Nt+2g; fIt;Nt+1; It+2g;
fIt;Nt+1;Nt+2g; fNt; It+1; It+2g; fNt; It+1;Nt+2g; fNt;Nt+1; It+2g; fNt;Nt+1;Nt+2g:
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3.4.1 Old
As we stated above, old people, in the case of innovation policy, only incur in
costs: once the new technology is in place, they will be dead. Their optimal
choice is always to vote against, since vOt is their only choice that has to be
made. Moreover, they do not need to anticipate future political outcomes.
3.4.2 Adult
When adult, agents vote over the innovation that will be implemented next
period. In principle, the decision to vote for an innovation or not depends on
the di¤erential utility that has to be computed for every future outcome of the
majority choiceMt+1. Due to the functional form of the utility, adult do not care
about tomorrows outcome of the innovation policy: income and substitution
e¤ects cancel out for what concerns tomorrows cost of innovating. They decide
to innovate, i¤:
uAt (Mt+1 = I) = u
A
t (Mt+1 = N) = u
A
t (v
A
t = )  uAt (vAt = ) > 0 (12)
where uAt depends on ht 1 and Mt 1. Writing explicitly (12), we nd:
uAt =  log(1  i  s) + pt log(1 + ) + pt log(1  )   log(1  s) > 0 (13)
Let us assume from now on that  > (1   )    1: this condition on the
relative magnitude of TFP improving parameter and human capital depreci-
ation parameter states that, in the case that an innovation takes place, the
improvement in the production of nal good exceeds the worsening of the qual-
ity of human capital used in production. Algebraically, this condition makes
the denominator of PA to be positive. It is easy to show that the same consid-
eration will be e¤ective also for PY , which we will dene in the next paragraph.
Moreover, note that limi!0+ pA = 0 and limi!(1 s)  pA = +1.
In (13), under the assumption above, adults enjoy a higher utility, in the
case of innovation, the higher is their life expectancy: they experience a benet
from the technology parameter  that augments, proportionally with pt, their
pension when old. Conversely, they experience a cost, proportional with pt,
from the depreciation of their childrens human capital (even though this cost
is mitigated by the elasticity of human capital in the production of the nal
good).
Simple calculations lead to the following expression, where pA is the value
of life expectancy above which adults are in favour of innovation:
pt >
 log

1 s
1 s i

log(1 + ) +  log(1  )  p
A (14)
Adults vote for an innovation if and only if they will get higher resources (net
of innovation costs) when old, in the form of pensions paid by their children12 .
12 In the meantime, adults children are became adult themselves.
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The threshold PA is a positive function of i: the more expensive the adoption
of a new innovation is, the less the adult will be innovation-prone. The same
consideration holds for : due to the adoption of a new technology, the more the
human capital depreciates, the less the adult will be in favour of implementing
the new technology itself. Conversely, an increase in the growth rate of TFP
is conducive for a new technology to be preferred by adult. Note that the
elasticity of past human capital in the production of the new human capital ()
is not involved in adults decisions: we will see below that only young take into
account how the past level of human capital a¤ects the next periods human
capital accumulation. The higher the share is of adults income going to nance
olds pensions, the less the adult will vote for innovation.13 The more people
are oriented toward adult age consumption (i.e. for high values for ), the less
they will be in favour of innovation. Lastly, an increase in the elasticity of
human capital in the production of nal good () works against innovation: to
innovate is to make a part of human capital achieved during youth depreciate,
and the higher its e¤ectiveness in production is, the higher the loss is in terms
of pensions paid by adult.
3.4.3 Young
Young vote over innovation taking into account bothMt+1 andMt+2, so in prin-
ciple there are four possible future congurations: fIt+1; It+2g, fIt+1;Nt+2g,
fNt+1;Nt+2g and fNt+1; It+2g. For the same argument stated above, what will
happen at time (t+1) and (t+2) does not inuence youngs vote today. Thus,
they only base their decision on achieved state variables. The condition under
which young will be in favour of innovation is:
uYt (Mt+1 = I;Mt+2 = I) = u
Y
t (Mt+1 = I;Mt+2 = N) = (15)
= uYt (Mt+1 = N ;Mt+2 = N) = u
Y
t (Mt+1 = N ;Mt+2 = I) =
= uYt (v
Y
t = )  uYt (vYt = ) > 0
and again uYt depends on ht 1 and Mt 1. An explicit expression of (15) is:
uAt = log(1  i)+ log(1+)+ log(1 )+pt log(1+)+pt log(1 ) > 0
(16)
Here young, in case of innovation, again directly benet from the technologic
parameter , but now it impacts both their labour income when adults and the
pension benets when retired. In this last case the benet from innovation is
proportional to pt, so a longer life gives more time to enjoy higher consumption.
The cost structure is similar: a constant cost is due to the depreciation of human
capital when young become adults, through a smaller marginal productivity in
the production of nal good. Another cost, proportional to pt, takes into account
the depreciation of human capital of youngs children: two periods later, in
13There is a strand of literature that studies how pension systems are implemented, why
they are so big, which policies are enforceable in this context, etc. For simplicity we take s as
given, but we think this could be one of the rst improvements to our work.
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fact, todays young will get a pension that will be, in terms of human capital,
depreciated because of todays choice to innovate. Therefore the depreciation
term is mitigated by two terms,  and : the rst takes into account the elasticity
between the production of new human capital and the past stock of human
capital, the latter the elasticity of human capital in the production of nal
good.
Simple calculations lead to the expression of pY , the value of life expectancy
above which young are in favour of innovation:
pt >
  [log(1  i) +  log(1 + ) +  log(1  )]
log(1 + ) +  log(1  )  p
Y (17)
Youngs choices over innovation shows similar determinants as adults. Again
the threshold level is negatively correlated with the TFP growth rate () induced
by innovation. The depreciation of human capital in the case of innovation ()
is a factor that discourages young, as long as adult, to vote for innovation.
Moreover, with the assumption about the sign of the denominator made above,
we can state what follows.
Proposition 2 For small values of the innovation costs young are in favour of
innovation, whatever value the other parameters take.
Proof. We need that pY < 0 for some small values of i. With the assumption
that log(1+)+ log(1 ) > 0, being log(1 ) < 0 and 0 < " < 1, log(1+)+
 log(1  ) > 0 and 0 < log(1+)+ log(1 )log(1+)+ log(1 ) < 1. Since pY (i) is continuous and
increasing in 0 < i < (1   s) and limi!0+ pY =  

log(1+)+ log(1 )
log(1+)+ log(1 )

< 0,
the proposition is proved. Moreover, if limi!(1 s) pY (i) < 0, young are in favour
of innovation for any value of innovation costs.
The e¤ect of the elasticity of past human capital in the production of hu-
man capital () can be, in principle, either negative or positive. The interesting
range of pY is, however, the positive one: here @p
Y
@ > 0. A high inertia in the
transmission of human capital from one generation to the other leads to less
interest in innovation because, as in Boucekkine et al. (2002), human capital
depreciates and the more it ages, the more its obsolescence makes it less pro-
ductive. Conversely to the case of adult, for young a higher concern for adult
age consumption  is conducive to innovation: since they can, innovating, boost
the production in adult age, they are in favour of new technologies.
3.5 Political outcome
We now deal with the political analysis: we show, for di¤erent parameters
ranges and initial conditions of life expectancy, which innovation policy is un-
dertaken and which policy implications are implied. In table 1 we resume the
partial e¤ects that the single parameters have on the thresholds we dened
above, in particular pA, pY and p^. They correspond to the value of life ex-
pectancy above which adults are in favour of innovation, young are in favour of
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innovation and the value below which adults alone choose (since they represent
the absolute majority of the constituency), respectively.
pA pY p^
 0 0 -
 + - 0
 - - 0
i + + 0
 + + 0
 + + 0
 0 + 0
s + 0 0
Tab.1. Partial e¤ects of parameters on thresholds.
In g. 6, we represent, for generic values of parameters, the function (11)
indicating which are the choices of agents. Shaded areas represent the sets
in the space fi; ptg in which innovation is undertaken. Since vOt = ; 8t 2
N+, we only report on the graph the choice vector of adult and young, Ct =
(vAt ; v
Y
t ). Resuming, below the line p^ adult choose the policy, no matter what
young choose. Above pA and pY adult and young are in favour of innovation,
respectively. Note that above p^, in order to implement an innovation, both adult
and young have to be innovation-prone. On the horizontal axis we put the cost
of innovation, while on the vertical axis we have the life expectancy at time t.
Fig.6. Political choices and outcomes. Shaded areas mean "innovation". In brackets, votes of adult and young.
In gure 6 young are particularly hostile to innovation: only for very small
values of i they vote . Innovation is ensured, however, for higher values of i
and intermediate values of life expectancy, in the shaded area characterized by
the choice vector (; ): here adults are "dictators" and they choose innovation,
against youngs will. In gure 7 we again show the function (11) for eight dif-
ferent congurations of parameters: the rst (a) is what we call the benchmark,
the other seven are graphed changing, one by one, the values of the parameters
; ; ; ; ;  and s.
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a)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
b)
      s
0.85 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
c)
      s
0.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
d)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 2 0.1 0.5 0.1
e)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1
f )
      s
0.5 0.3 0.02 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1
g)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.05 0.1
h)
      s
0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4
Fig.7. Plots of pA (thin line), pY (bold line) and p^ (dashed line) for di¤erent parameters congurations.
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Analyzing g.6, in case (b) a larger representativeness of young (i.e. higher )
leads to the vanishing of the region in which adult alone decide for innovation.
In case (c) we note that a high concern of adult age consumption leads the
two curves pAand pY to separate: the former shifts up, the latter shifts down.
Moreover, in case the two curves do not intersect, the position of p^ does not
a¤ect the political outcome: adults threshold binds for all (pt; i) pairs, so they
have a veto power against youngs willingness to innovate. A general result:
Remark 3 In the case pA > pY : 8i 2 (0; 1   s) the political outcomes in the
case of "workersdictatorship" and "diluted power" are the same.
Case (d) shows the intuitive e¤ect of an increase in : both the curves shift
down, leading innovation to be preferred for a wide set of i and pt. p^ does
not move and there is room for adults choice of innovation in early stages of
development (i.e. when life expectancy is short). In (e) a higher depreciation
rate of human capital in the case of innovation makes both adult and young less
favourable to innovate. pY is more sensitive than pA to this change: for young a
depreciation of human capital reects in less labour income when adult and less
pensions when old. A very low elasticity of human capital in the nal sector, 
in case (f), makes education almost useless in terms of adulthood income and
people choose to work the most of their youth time, see (9), and so innovation
is relatively more preferred because it substitutes human capital in production.
A decrease in the elasticity of past human capital in the production of human
capital,  in case (g), shows a similar e¤ect. An increase in the share s of adult
income going to pension contribution (h) leaves unchanged pY and p^, while pA
shifts upward, shrinking the set of i and pt where innovation is implemented.
Resuming the purely political stage of the analysis, we can conclude that at
individual level, peoples willingness to innovate increases with life expectancy,
the growth rate of innovation itself and, for young, the preference for adult age
consumption. Conversely it decreases with the cost of innovation, the depreci-
ation rate of human capital introduced by innovation, the elasticity of human
capital in nal production and, for adult, the share of income going to paying
old peoples pensions. Once we turn to the aggregate level, that is the political
choice implemented, we look, at the same time, to pA, pY and, more important,
to p^: given the structure of the generations, the economy as a whole chooses to
implement a new technology if and only if the majority of its voting inhabitants
are in favour of innovation. In the case of pt < p^ this maps one to one to the
decision of adult, while for values of pt above p^ we need adult and young to
be contemporaneously in favour. In the case that, for some congurations of
parameters, young are relatively more averse to innovation14 than adult (i.e.
small , large , small ), for small values of life expectancy innovation is not
implemented, if life expectancy of agents increases a bit, then innovation is
implemented without the consensus of young. One more increase in life ex-
pectancy can lead again to stop innovation due to the loss of absolute majority
14With "more averse" we mean that there are regions of the parametersspace where pY >
pA.
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by adult. In the case that a further increase of life expectancy can again bring
innovation, then young support innovation and form a coalition with adult. We
show this example in the next section, analyzing the political and the economic
mechanisms jointly.
4 A simple dynamic exercise
In this section we simulate the behavior of an economy characterized by the
features described at the end of the section above. The reason is that this
example can embrace dynamically all the four interesting political congurations
described: (i) an aversion to innovation caused by a too short life expectancy; (ii)
a short-lived innovation period guaranteed by adult workersabsolute majority;
(iii) another period without innovation caused by youngs aversion and (iv)
again innovation, once the life expectancy is long enough. Since we want to
show the possibility of multiple equilibria, we run the simulation for both high
and low initial human capital: with same parameters, in the former case the
economy reaches, in the end, sustained growth, while in the latter it ends in a
poverty trap, with short life expectancy, no innovation and not much education.
We make some simplication in order to have easily readable results. First of
all we assume that, in the case an innovation takes place, the human capital
does not depreciate (i.e.  = 0). In this way the human capital accumulation
function is the same in both the cases of innovation and no innovation. With
this assumption, it comes out that the parameter  a¤ects only the shape of the
human capital accumulation function and not pY . About p(ht), among many
functions characterized by a mapping [0;1)! (0; 1], we opt out for the simple,
but exible, specication chosen by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002)15 :
p(ht) =
p+ pht
1 + ht
; with ;  > 0
Where  and  jointly determine the speed at which the function goes from
p to p and the value of ht where the function shows the turning point that
separates the initial convexity with the concavity that characterize higher levels
of ht16 . In line with Blackburn and Cipriani, we choose to set  = 0:001,  = 2,
p = 0:1 and p = 1.  is bigger than one in order to ensure that p00(h) is initially
positive and then negative, with a turning point in hT = 18:2574. The utility
function shows  = 0:3. In the human capital production function  = 5 and
 = 0:9, while in the production of nal good  = 0:1,  = 0:6 and A0 = 2. The
share of adults labour income going to fund pensions is s = 0:1, while the cost
of innovation is a share i = 0:1. We assume that the political weight of young
is  = 0:5.
15The authors report a detailed analysis of this function: we suggest referring to their work
for all the technicalities.
16For a given value of (); an increase (decrease) in () reduces the turning point, while
for a given value of such a point, an increase (decrease) in () raises the speed of transition
(the limiting case of which is when p(:) changes value from p to p instantaneously, which
corresponds to the case of a step function).
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With this setup, the human capital production function shows the fea-
tures of gure 3. The steady states are four, alternatively unstable and sta-
ble: h = f0; 0:59; 19:56; 1610:96g. In the case initial human capital is below
h0 = 19:56, the economy converges, without ever innovating, to a poverty trap
where the equilibrium youth time devoted to education is eP = 0:189, old age
life expectancy decreases until p = 0:100134, and human capital level decrease
until the lowest stable steady state value 0:59.
In case the initial human capital is above h0 = 19:56 (which corresponds
to an initial life expectancy p0 = 0:349), human capital starts to increase. We
refer to gure 8 in order to give a graphical intuition to the explanation.
Fig.8. The evolution of life expectancy when h0>19:56. Shaded areas mean "innovation".
The initial state is point (A): here life expectancy is below both pA and p^,
so adult alone decides not to innovate. Human capital, however, accumulates
and life expectancy, in turn, increases. This occurs for some periods, then
life expectancy lengthening makes adult prefer innovation (B): the economy
experiences some periods during which both human capital and production (the
latter at a higher speed than the former) grow. Then life expectancy passes the
threshold p^: at this time adults lose the absolute majority and young, being
against innovation (pt > p^), force the political outcome to be "no innovation"
(C). Here the economy evolves, again showing increases in both human capital
and nal good production level, but at the same pace. Once young also feels
the net benets of innovation (D), the economy reaches the upper bound of
life expectancy p, the higher steady state of human capital hH = 1610:96, the
schooling time eH = 0:4185 and the production of nal good increases at a rate
.
Of course the aim of this exercise is not to show the real evolution of a given
economy, but to understand what the political and economic forces are that
lead the economy toward its destiny: to understand the type and the timing of
the policies that need to be implemented is crucial when constraints on human
capital accumulation and/or innovation are in place.
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5 Conclusions
Over the past century, all OECD countries were characterized by a dramatic
increase in economic conditions, life expectancy and qualities and quantities
of di¤erent kinds of knowledge. So, it is natural to suppose that the increase
in longevity of citizens is an important factor in determining the life-cycle be-
haviour of individuals. At the same time, it is unnatural to suppose that life
expectancy is exogenous and independent of economic conditions. The purpose
of this paper is to provide a theory that explains how an economy might evolve
when the longevity of its citizens both inuences and is inuenced by the process
of economic development, especially when choices are upon two dimensions: the
private choice of education and the public one of innovation policy.
Assuming, condently, that longevity is positively correlated with the level
of human capital, the increase of life expectancy that economies are experienc-
ing is, in principle, growth-enhancing. However, its e¤ectiveness can be harmed
by, at least, two phenomena. First, building on Blackburn and Cipriani (2002),
we reach their same conclusions about the pure economic e¤ects of an increase
in longevity: due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on expected life ex-
pectancy, it can be the case that lower levels of human capital lead to a too
short life, and this in turns disincentives people to invest in education, giving
rise to a poverty trap. At this stage of development, life expectancy is short
and human capital stock is small. Second, we deal with the political features
of an economy where the engines of growth are human capital accumulation
and systemic technologic innovation. Our idea is that, as we are stressing from
the introduction onward, a variation in life expectancy a¤ects the individual
incentives to innovate and it alters also the aggregate choices of the economy,
since political representativeness of di¤erent age classes changes. Our argument
is that during rst stages of development, when human capital is negligible, life
expectancy is short and retired people are few, the political power is in the hand
of adult workers alone. The decision to innovate or not coincides, therefore, with
adults choice. In the case their incentives to innovate are small (for example
a large share of labour income going to nance the PAYGO pension system,
a large elasticity of the human capital used in production or a high concern
in adult age consumption) they impose to the whole economy a no innovation
regime. In developed economies, where life expectancy is higher, human capital
endowment is large, life expectancy is long and retired people are several, a
political majority that enforces an innovation policy can be achieved only by
means of a coalition. Since elderly people are innovation averse, the only way
for an innovation to be implemented is that both young and adult are in favour
of innovation. Therefore, if on the one hand a longer life expectancy pushes
peoples incentives toward innovation, on the other hand it makes the political
weight of old increase, making the achievement of a consensus for innovation
potentially more di¢ cult. This is true, in particular, when youngs incentives
for innovation are lower than the ones of adult, especially in the case of a high
inertia in the transmission of human capital from one generation to the next
one and when the concern for adult age consumption is small.
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The road that leads to sustained growth is far from being straight: we can
nd path dependency in the human capital accumulation, because in some cases
an initial small amount of human capital can lead to a poverty trap, where the
equilibrium longevity is not enough for adult (or adult and young in the case
of not-so-short life expectancy) to vote for innovation. In case the initial level
of human capital is high enough (or there is no room, in the accumulation
function of human capital, for multiple equilibria), a high equilibrium level of
human capital is achieved, with longer life expectancy. Again, an innovation is
voted if and only if both adult and young are in favour.
With this paper we provide the basis for joining together two strands of the
literature on economic growth that are gaining importance in the research and
political debate: technologic innovation and aging population. We stress how
di¤erent links run between these two phenomena, dening the possible conict
of interests among di¤erent generations and showing how the lengthening of life
expectancy changes the way this conict of interests is solved. Moreover, we
stress how private and public choices combine (or not) in order to give birth to
a human capital abundant, growing economy.
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